Abstract: This article argues the following points. The Hobbesian hypothesis, which we dene as the claim that all people are better o under state authority than they would be outside of it, is an empirical claim about all stateless societies. It is an essential premise in most contractarian justications of government sovereignty. Many smallscale societies are stateless. Anthropological evidence from them provides sucient reason to doubt the truth of the hypothesis, if not to reject it entirely. Therefore, contractarian theory has not done what it claims to do: it has not justied state sovereignty to each person subject to it by demonstrating that they benet from that authority. To be justied in contractarian terms, states have to do something to improve the living standards of disadvantaged people under their rule.
Introduction
At a time when Hobbesians and Lockeans were repeating fanciful centuries-old stories about the state of nature, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels based their claims about prehistory on the best evidence then available in anthropology and archaeology (Engels 2004; Marx 1994) . Their concern with providing good evidence for the empirical claims is one of their great contributions to political theory and political philosophy 1 in their work. Although their work on prehistory contradicted assumptions of Hobbesian and Lockean theorists, they rejected these and other approaches wholesale and did not address their specics (Wilde 1994) .
Perhaps they left unnished business. A century and a half later, philosophers still pass on fanciful stories about prehistory, and those stories have power. Marx and Engels's eort to use what anthropological information they had to build up new theories was worthwhile, but it is also useful to bring that kind of information to bear on existing theories.
Of course, fanciful stories are ne if they are merely illustrative examples with no empirical content. But our research project, which includes the forthcoming book, Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Widerquist/McCall forthcoming) , 2 argues that many such stories are repeated because they illustrate important empirical premises about prehistoric or small-scale societies. It also argues that many theorists who don't directly refer to prehistory make universal claims that can be contradicted or conrmed by evidence of such societies. The project uses extensive textual analysis to show the presence of these empirical claims because theories in question are often unclear whether and the extent to which they rely on empirical claims. Critics have been slow both to criticize the lack of clarity and to challenge the claims empirically. It is time to examine what those claims are and evaluate them against the best available evidence.
The goal of this project is entirely negative. It criticizes existing theories without building up an alternative. It shows how existing theories rely on empirical claims, provides evidence that raises doubt about those claims, and discusses the ramications of those ndings within the context of those theories. It considers possible responses but it does not attempt to give a denitive answer whether the existing theories should be modied or replaced.
The goal of this article is to preview our ndings for part of this research project in which we address an empirical claim we call`the Hobbesian hypothesis': everyone is better o in a society with a sovereign government than in a stateless society. Section 2 shows how Hobbesian social contract theory (contractarianism) relies on this claim to justify government sovereignty. Section 3 shows how this claim has survived for centuries as if unchallenged despite criticism. Section 4 presents evidence that provides good reason to doubt this claim and perhaps to reject it entirely. Contractarians have not provided good reason to believe that existing states meet the minimal conditions as necessary for contractarian theory to justify state authority.
Section 5 discusses the implications of this nding. We doubt any supporters will respond by saying that because states haven't delivered what the theories promise, all people of the Earth are morally bound to get rid of governments and immediately restore the small-scale lifestyle we use as a counter example. We consider possibilities involving challenging our empirical ndings, accepting them, or rejecting them as irrelevant. We do not argue that the Hobbesian hypothesis can never be true; only that it is not true at the current time. Life in small-scale stateless societies is no ideal. It is dicult in many ways. To use it as a baseline for comparison is to set a very low bar, one that modern states have failed to surpass mostly out of neglect. Better attention to the side eects of the modern economy and greater care for the disadvantaged have the potential to ensure that virtually everyone is better o under state authority. If this standard is ever reached, a state that fullls the contractarian criteria for justication is possible, but for now, contractarianism does not justify most states.
Before moving on we should say one thing about what this project is not. We do not intend to say that a priori reasoning as no value or that all philosophers should cite anthropology or other empirical science. A pure a priori theory needs no empirical support, but the contractarian justication of the state is not a pure a priori theory. Thomas Hobbes aspired to be a pure a priori theorist, rest of this article. We cite original sources or none at all, but refer readers to the book for further argument and evidence.
but his actual method, as Gregory S. Kavka (1986, 4) argues, is, logical and conceptual analysis combined with empirical observation and probabilistic reasoning. Whatever his intentions, the state of nature Hobbes denes exists in the world (as argued below), and therefore claims about it can potentially be veried or falsied by observational evidence. The contractarian school of thought that followed Hobbes cannot remain purely a priori as long as its justication of the state relies on the empirical comparison of state society with a stateless environment. We argue that most contractarians have yet to adequately address the empirical side of their argument.
The Hobbesian Hypothesis
The contractarian justication of the state asks the question why does any person or institution have authority over an individual? Dierent versions of contractarianism rely on at least three dierent answers. (1) Everyone consents to it. (2) Everyone benets from it. (3) Everyone benets so much from it that any rational and reasonable person would consent to it even if not everyone actually agrees. These answers are closely related because usually one agrees to something because one nds it benecial. Any of them puts contractarianism within the greater class of mutual advantage theories, and The logic of mutual advantage theories is that everyone must gain from the agreement (Moore 1994, 211) . Thus contractarianism is limited in that it provides no criterion about when and whether it might be acceptable to improve A's position at the expense of B.
Modern contractarian theory is heavily inuenced by Thomas Hobbes's 1651 book, Leviathan, which justies government sovereignty as a tacit or hypothetical contract, by which everyone agrees to move from the`state of nature' to state society. Although Hobbes's description of the state of nature is complex, his denition of it is simple. It is used interchangeably with`anarchy' and with`the absence of sovereignty'. The term`state of nature' is largely an artifact of a discarded belief in a dichotomy between natural and civilized people. Today most human scientists believe all societies are equally articial and equally natural. People naturally come up with dierent ways to live. People in the distant past came up with ways to live; so do people today; so will people in the future. All of their lifeways are equally natural.
However, the word`nature' in`state of nature' is relevant in at least two senses. First, contractarians portray their description of it as the inevitable result of the absence of state sovereignty. This empirical claim is central to most contractarian justications of the state, and it is the one we question here. Second, anarchy is the natural point of comparison for versions of contractarianism that limit their focus to the basic justication of sovereignty: state authority is justied if and when it benets the people living under that authority relative to how well o they would be outside that authority. Such theories are, about the minimal conditions of political obligation, not the principles of morality, social justice, or the ideal society (Kavka 1986, 402) . The comparison to the state of nature is meant to determine whether the state meets those minimal conditions, not whether it meets an ideal. For Hobbes, three things come into existence with the social contract: state sovereignty, morality, and society. Contract theory can be used to justify any of these three things together or separately. There are versions of contract theory that model morality or society through a contract device without involving government. There are also theories justifying government with a contract devise but without the state of nature as the alternative. This article is unrelated to any such theories. Its use of the word`contractarianism' should be read narrowly as`theories justifying state authority by contract devise involving a comparison to the state of nature'.
Although contractarianism asks a limited question, it sets up the need for a strong empirical claim. The move from the state of nature to the state requires that everyone consents and/or benets. Literally speaking, it implies that the worst placed individual in state society is better o than the best-place individual in the state of nature. Most contractarians have not clearly specied what a less-than-literal interpretation of everyone implies for the people who aren't part of everyone. Presumably they use`everyone' in the sense of a representative person of the most disadvantaged recognizable group, not one individual with extraordinarily bad luck. Still, the claim is very strongin the sense of far-reaching, not in the sense of well-supported. We take it to imply that a representative person of the most disadvantaged recognizable group is at least as well o as they could reasonably hope to be in any stateless environment. It also implies that people wouldn't needlessly be exposed to risks for the benet of others; the extraordinarily unlucky truly are extraordinary. The comparison of the best reasonable expectation in the state of nature to the worst reasonable possibility in state society follows from the logic of contractarian theory, in which the state of nature needs no justication, but the imposition of sovereignty does. It might be normatively plausible to base a justication of the state on benets that are less-widely shared than this, but doing so moves out of the realm of social contract theory and brings up normative questions that contractarians rarely address (see section 5).
Hobbes makes the everyone-benets claim plausible in its most literal sense by arguing that without a sovereign to settle disputes, peace is impossible. Therefore, everyone lives in fear, and none of the benets of human cooperation are possible. The impossibility of having peace outside of state authority is the causal factor for Hobbes, and if he is correct, even the most-able person in the state of nature is so miserable they could hardly be worse o in any other situation. Hobbes writes:
Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against every one. [. . . ] during the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man against every man. [. . . ] [with] no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 1962, 100) This is what we call the Hobbesian hypothesis, essentially: everyone under a sovereign government is better o (or no worse o) than any of them would be outside of that authority.
Hobbes argues for his description of statelessness with a logical argument from assumptions about human nature, casual empirical observations about psychology, and empirical references to two examples of the state of nature: life during a civil war and in contemporary stateless societies. He writes, the savage people in many places of America [. . . ] have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner (Hobbes 1962, 101) .
Hobbes uses an illustrative example in which state begins with a contract. His origin story does not have to be true for social contract theory to successfully justify sovereignty, but at least one premise from this story (the Hobbesian hypothesis) must be true to make the justication successful. Although people who want to categorize Hobbes as a pure a priori theorist might be tempted to say that the state of nature is merely a heuristic or an ontological assumption, a purely ctional characterization makes the theory incapable of justifying anything. Certainly the following is a very bad argument:
Premise 1 (P1): I can tell a story, in which everything is terrible without X.
P2: This story is pure ction with no empirical analog. Conclusion (C): Therefore, we are justied in forcing X on everyone.
Contemporary theorists recognizing the importance of this empirical claim include Richard Tuck (1996) in the editor's introduction to the Cambridge edition of Leviathan; David Gauthier (1969, 164) ; Gregory S. Kavka (1986, 4, 78, 24, 4023) ; Jean Hampton (1988, 271); Iain Hampsher-Monk (1992, 27); Russell Hardin (2003, 423) ; George Klosko (2004, 8); and Kinch Hoekstra (2007, 113, 117) , who writes in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan: Does Hobbes think that the natural condition of war of all against all ever did or could exist? His readers have long denied it; but if the scenario is unreal, it is hard to see how it is supposed to be pertinent, and more particularly how it can tell us anything about the nature of our obligations.
As we said above, the need for the Hobbesian hypothesis comes from the principle of mutual advantage or the marginally weaker principle of do no harm. David Gauthier names this principle`the Lockean proviso' because Locke used a similar principle to justify private property rights. Gauthier writes, For us the proviso plays a wider and more basic role. We treat it as a general constraint, by which we may move from a Hobbesian state of nature [. . . ] to the initial position for social interaction (Gauthier 1986, 205, 208) .
Many philosophers recognize this principle as basic to the central goal of contractarianism: to justify authority to any reasonable or rational person sub-ject to it (D'Agostino/Gaus/Thrasher 2011; Martin 1998, 150; Moore 1994, 211; Scanlon 1998, 4, 187) . If and only if the proviso is fullled, the state meets the minimal conditions to justify its authority. State power over you is justied because it benets you. Kavka connects the`receipt of benets' relative to the state-of-nature baseline not only with contractarianism but also with justications of the state based on social utility, fair play, and gratitude (Kavka 1986, 40915 (Martin 1998, 150) Contractarianism's central normative premise (the Lockean proviso) is closely related to its central empirical premise (the Hobbesian hypothesis), which is simply the claim that the proviso is fullled. Other empirical claims (such as the original agreement) can be dismissed as mere heuristics, but without the Hobbesian hypothesis, state of nature reasoning has little left as justication. 3 The stunning feature of the contractarian literature is how quickly centuries of philosophers go from normative proviso to empirical hypothesis. They dedicate extensive argument to establish the need for the proviso. Then, with little argument, they simply ask readers to presume the proviso is fullled, often without specifying exactly what the claim of fulllment means empirically. A more scientic way to handle such an important hypothesis is to investigate its truthvalue.
The correct word for an unveried empirical claim is a hypothesis. Hence we are unapologetic about attributing this term to Hobbes and other theorists making similar claims although they might not use that word. Any hypothesis should be accepted or rejected based on observational evidence.
Our method of criticizing the Hobbesian hypothesis will be to examine small- (Ryan 1996, 218) This much is enough to falsify the hypothesis that anarchy inherently leads to a war of all against all. But the contractarian justication of the state could be sustained with a weaker claim that stateless societies have unacceptable levels of violence (even if they don't fall apart) or that for some other reasons, such as the inability to enforce contracts, their welfare level is so low that no one would prefer them.
Whatever the welfare level is in stateless societies and whatever the reason, the contractarian justication of the state is that a sovereign government can do better. The proviso establishes the welfare level of people in stateless societies as the baseline of comparison for people in state society. If some reasonable approximation of everyone makes it to that threshold (i.e. if the Hobbesian hypothesis is true), the Lockean proviso is fullled, and the minimal conditions necessary to justify government in contractarian terms are met. If not, the justication fails, and presumably then states will have to start treating their disadvantaged people better to meet those minimal conditions, but other responses are possible (see section 5).
Although there are other possible alternatives to the state, we focus only on one: small-scale indigenous communities, because if one justies sovereignty on the grounds that the state of nature is worse for everyone, they have to show that the absence of sovereignty is always worse for everyone, whenever it appears. As section 5 argues, critics can focus on one alternative; supporters have to address all alternatives to provide a plausible justication of the state.
The`Debate' Over the Hobbesian Hypothesis
Although the Hobbesian hypothesis has never been universally accepted, it is hard to nd a real debate over it in 350 years of literature. One group asserts its truth. Another asserts its falsity. A third group researches the relevant facts without entering the discussion.
John Locke had a more appealing view of the state of nature, but he agreed with Hobbes that all people in England in their century were better o than all people in stateless societies. Locke merely attributes the improvement to property rights rather than the state. He writes, [Native] Americans [. . . ] who are rich in land [. . . ] have not one hundredth part of the conveniencies we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-labourer in England. (Locke 1960, Second Treatise, Chapter 5, 41) The dierence between Hobbesian and Lockean normative theory is substantial but because the societies we use as counterexamples have neither landownership nor sovereignty, for our purposes the dierence between their empirical claims is negligible.
David Hume famously criticized contractarianism on empirical grounds, but less famously, he endorsed the Hobbesian hypothesis. After rejecting consent as the justication for government, he writes: If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer, Because society could not otherwise subsist. (Hume 1960 , emphasis original) Presumably, he believes life would be very bad if society did not subsist, but that is the Hobbesian hypothesisat least if it's bad for everyone. Hume skips the need for consent by going directly from the Hobbesian hypothesis to the justication of government sovereignty. He has a signicant disagreement with Hobbes's normative theory but not with his empirical hypothesis.
Thomas Paine (2012) embraced a contractarian normative reasoning writing, the rst principle of civilization ought [. . . ] to be, that the condition of every person born into the world, after a state of civilization commences, ought not to be worse than if he had been born before that period (Paine 2012). But he argued that states had not yet satised this principle because urban workers were actually worse o than their Native American contemporaries living in stateless societies. Unfortunately Paine, like Hobbes and Locke, included no empirical support for these claims.
The Baron de Montesquieu (2001, 204) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1984; both criticized the claim that the state of nature was necessarily a state of war, but the evidence available at the time was limited, and neither of them mounted an extensive empirical challenge to the Hobbesian hypothesis. For example, although Montesquieu presented extensive empirical-historical arguments on many topics, the evidence he presented on this issue was limited to the single example of an abandoned, disabled child discovered in Germany (2001, 20) .
Marx and Engels produced a great deal of work that contradicted the Hobbesian hypothesis, most of it supported by sociological and anthropological evidence. They argued that recorded history is the history of class struggle; that workers were experiencing increasing exploitation, alienation, and immiseration. They argued that`primitive communism', while not idyllic, existed without most of these problems. These claims combined indicate that nineteenth-century state society was mixed at best and perhaps substantially worse for some relative to stateless societies. From that one might conclude states did not satisfy conditions necessary to justify them in contractarian terms. But as mentioned above Marx and Engels weren't interested in putting these elements together in that way (Engels 2004; Marx 1994; Wilde 1994) .
Marx and Engels's work on prehistory was not ignored, but at a time of increasing specialization, it was taken up by empirical rather than normative theorists. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century writers such as Henry Sumner Maine (1861 , 901, 1149 ) and Henry Sidgwick (1966 ) criticized Hobbes and Locke on empirical grounds, but they distanced themselves from normative philosophy in favor of empirical political science. As disciplines became increasingly specialized, it became easier for normative theorists to pass on the Hobbesian hypothesis even as other elds uncovered contrary evidence. Our search of contractarian literature has found no response to Paine, Marx, Maine, Sidgwick, or contemporary anthropologists.
Contemporary Lockeans often repeat the hypothesis usually with little or no empirical support. Robert Nozick (1974, 182) declares, I believe that the free operation of a market system will not actually run afoul of the Lockean proviso.
[. . . ] Here I make an empirical historical claim; as does someone who disagrees with this. Eric Mack (1995, 213) writes, the development of liberal market orders presents people with at least`as much' (in transgured form) for their use' as does the pre-property state of nature. Although Jan Narveson (1988, 92) denies the need for any proviso, he nevertheless asserts that it is fullled, a beggar in Manhattan is enormously better o than a primitive person in any state-of-nature situation short of the Garden of Eden. Richard Epstein (1995, 62) writes, the overall size of the gain [from establishing a private property regime] is so large that we need not trouble ourselves over its distribution.
Gauthier endorses both the Lockean and Hobbesian versions of the hypothesis, writing, the rst appropriator of property, is the great benefactress of humankind (Gauthier 1986 (Gauthier , 2167 , but before Smith's invisible hand can do its benecial work, Hobbes's war of every man against every man must rst be exorcized (85).
Many contemporary political theorists assert the Hobbesian version of the hypothesis (Durant 2001, 157; Hardin 2003, 43; Klosko 2004, 19) . Jean Hampton argues that a purely hypothetical agreement can be justicational, but it is only the agreement that is hypothetical (Hampton 1988, 4) . The counterfactual claim that provides the justicational power of the hypothetical agreement is real (271). Even the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's 2014 edition includes a passing endorsement of it, If the parties are simply considering whether government is better than anarchy, they will opt for just about any government (D'Agostino et al. 2011).
J. R. Lucas tries to distance contractarian theory from empirical claims, writing the state of nature is, paradoxically, an articial concept (Lucas 1966, 62 ). Yet, he argues that there are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives of either having conicts settled by some method, the results of which are binding, and can be enforcedand this means having coercion and the State, or of having all become violent conicts, settled only by resort to force. He explains that if individuals attempt to settle conicts, any old how, violence is the necessary result (Lucas, 1966, 65) . If Lucas's claim is true it can be conrmed empirically. As Hampsher-Monk (1992, 27, emphasis original) argues, inasmuch as sovereignty is absent, to that extent men will begin to exhibit behaviour typical of the state of nature.
Writing in Ethics in 2001, Christopher Heath Wellman, like Hume, denies the claim that everyone agrees to government, but endorses the Hobbesian hypothesis: The advantages of political society are so great because life in the state of nature is so horrible. He oers only one sentence of empirical support for this claim, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant oered conicting accounts of human nature, but all agreed that a stateless environment is a perilous environment devoid of security (Wellman 2001, 736, 742) . He does not explain why these three long-dead philosophers rather than contemporary anthropologists should be taken as experts on the living standards of people in stateless societies.
Not all modern political theories require the Hobbesian hypothesis. A pure natural rights theory without a proviso would not need one. Utilitarianism and Rawlsianism maximize the position of the average and least advantaged people respectively. Both theories maximize relative to all other possible situations giving no special position to the state of nature. Both theories are normatively controversial and both create the empirical diculty of determining when their objective maximizations are fullled. But utilitarianism and Rawlsianism call for empirical inquiry in the implementation stage where the Hobbesian hypothesis assumes away any need for it.
Kavka's version of contractarianism is relatively invulnerable to this criticism because it denies the need for universal consent and includes a guaranteed economic minimum. It becomes vulnerable only because he doesn't call for empirical investigation to ensure the minimum is high enough to fulll the proviso. Furthermore, he supposes people with high abilities, low aversion to risk, or high willingness to dominate others will be the only groups likely to be better o outside state authority (Kavka 1986, 198-9) . For everyone elseincluding the disadvantagedhe invokes the Hobbesian hypothesis:
The parties are not unfree with respect to one another; none can coerce others to accept unfair or unreasonable terms of agreement. All are forced to compromise and accept less than they might wish because of the necessity to reach agreement. But this sort of pressure, when it applies equally (or approximately equally) to each, does not call the fairness or morality of the outcome into question; it simply reects a Hobbesian fact about the human conditionthat the State and (a high risk of) insecurity and poverty are exhaustive alternatives. (Kavka 1986, 4023) The empirical section of this article addresses that supposed Hobbesian fact. If disadvantaged people are actually worse o under state authority than in observed stateless societies, Kavka's claim that parties are not unfree with respect to one another is brought into doubt.
Evidence
To test the Hobbesian hypothesis we need to demonstrate that observable evidence of stateless societies exists. We nd it in the smallest-scale societies observed by ethnographers, usually called`hunter-gatherer bands'. They are not the only stateless societies, but we only need one example to falsify the hypothesis.
Although societies living at this scale vary in many ways, ethnographers have recognized among them enough regularity that most anthropologists are comfortable applying the name`band society' to all societies at this scale. The use of this term does not imply that there is any more similarity among band societies than there is among state societies (which include societies as diverse as Babylon, Byzantium, and Bolivia). Hunter-gatherer bands are small, nomadic foraging groups of normally about 15 to 50 people including children and elderly (Lee/Daly 1999, 3) . Not all hunter-gatherer societies are band societies, but virtually all band societies are hunter-gatherers. All Paleolithic societies and the vast majority of modern hunter-gatherer bands are nomadic. Their nomadism is almost always contained within a fairly distinct range (Bird-David 1994; Turnbull 1968, 135) . However, they do not usually claim exclusive control over this territory or strictly defend it against outsiders (Johnson/Earle 2000, 32) . Band societies generally treat the land they use as a commons. It is available for everyone's use but no entity can sell the land, divide it up, or make rules about it. Some bands recognize the non-excludability of land as applying to outsiders as well. Others assert some primacy over outsiders, but even then, territories overlap and a band cannot refuse another band that asks to forage on its territory without inviting conict (Bird-David 1994).
Many anthropologists have remarked on the lack of authority within all ethnographically observed band societies. Eleanor Leacock (1998, 143) writes, leadership as we conceive it is not merely`weak' or`incipient', as is commonly stated, but irrelevant. They have no recognized leaders, not even a consistent membership. People come and go. Their decision-making shows little or no concern for precedent or procedure. Disputes are resolved on an ad hoc basis, sometimes by discussion and compromise, sometimes by force, sometimes by splitting up (Bird-David 1994, 591, 597; Boehm 2001, 723, 867; Johnson/Earle 2000, 323; Lee/Daly 1999, 4; Renfrew 2007, 148; Salzman 2004, 478; Trigger 2003, 668; Woodburn 1982, 434 ).
Whether or not bands lack all authority, they clearly lack the types of state institutions contractarianism is supposed to justify. They have no sovereign governments or any consistent governing authority. No entity claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory, in Max Weber's terms (Weber 2004) . People in band society, live without a common power to keep them in awe in Hobbes's (1962, 100) terms, and they settle disputes any old how, in Lucas's (1966, 65) termsthe very conditions that supposedly lead inevitably to continual fear and a war of all against all. Thus, band societies t the denition of the state of nature. Do they t the contractarian description of it as well?
Hunter-gatherers, especially in band societies, have dicult lives. They go hungry some nights. Their life expectancy is signicantly less than in an early twenty-rst century developed capitalist states. To set them as a bar for comparison is to set a very low bar, but life in band societies is not the miserable existence of fear and danger supposed by Hobbes. And tragically, as this section reveals, state societies have failed to bring all of their citizens up to that bar.
If one phrase from all of political philosophy has penetrated the eld of anthropology, it is Hobbes's claim that life in the state of nature is`solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short'. We know of at least twenty anthropologists who have made reference to it only to debunk it in whole or in part (Aykroyd/Lucy/Pollard/Roberts 1999, 55; de Waal 2006, 52; Fried 1967, 51, 701; Gurven/Kaplan 2007, 349; Hill/Hurtado 1996, 151, 194; Kelly 1995, 202; Kuper 1994, 10920; Lee/Daly 1999, 1; Morris 1977, 188; Panter-Brick/Layton/ Rowley-Conwy 2001, 45; Peterson 1993; Salzman 2004, 47) .
Theorists asserting the Hobbesian hypothesis have not referred to rigorous measures of wellbeing, but have instead used ad hoc description of what they believe life without sovereignty must be like. And so, we make an ad hoc comparison starting with Hobbes's four characteristics (nasty and brutish being synonymous), and continuing with considerations of freedom, culture, industry, alienation, and observed choice.
Solitary
Life in band society is most certainly not solitary. It is extremely communal and (surprisingly?) cordial, much more so than typical Western societies. The constant demands for socializing is one of the striking features that ethnographers almost universally recognize in band societies ( 
Poor
By middle class standards, band life is materially poor. They produce very few material goods. But their life also has obvious advantages. Estimates of how hard they work vary considerably, but the controversy is whether they work about as much as or less than typical workers today. No ethnographers have found evidence of overworked hunter-gatherer band members constantly struggling to provide subsistence for their families. Probably the widest summary of studies is Clark (2007, 64) . One of the more pessimistic studies found band members working 49 hours per week including food preparation, childcare, and walkingve hours less than the most comparable gures we can nd for the average U.S. worker (Aguiar/Hurst 2007, 976; Hill/Kaplan/Hawkes/Hurtado 1985). No bands work as hard or as long as industrial sweatshop laborers; none resort to child labor as so many families are forced to today (Sharif 2003) .
While most hunter-gatherers eat a varied diet high in protein and low in starch, many people in contemporary state societies struggle with various forms of malnutrition, and two-thirds of the people alive today are involuntary vegetarians (Harris 1977, x) . Band societies even provide a higher and more reliable economic minimum than capitalist states. Today 963 million people across the world are hungry, and almost 16,000 children die from hunger-related causes every day (Black/Morris/Bryce 2003; Food-and-Agriculture-Organization-of-theUnited-Nations 2008). According to Woodburn (1968, 51) , for a Hadza to die of hunger, or even to fail to satisfy his hunger for more than a day or two, is almost inconceivable.
Unemployment and homelessness are inconceivable in band societies. People are free to work for themselves; free to build an appropriate shelter; free to use the resources of the Earth to meet their needs.
Nasty and Brutish
The causal factor in Hobbesian theory of the state of nature is supposed to be violence. All the other drawbacks of the state of nature ow from the supposed impossibility of keeping the peace without a sovereign power to settle disputes. This belief is simply false. Some societies do live in peace without such an authority. As Robert Kelly remarks, life in foraging societies is not all sweetness and light but neither is it a Hobbesian hell (Kelly 1995, 202) .
Some popular writers have recently argued that high rates of violence exist in small-scale societies (Diamond 2012; Pinker 2012), but the anthropological record is much more mixed than they indicate. Although stateless societies with extremely high levels of homicide exist, so do stateless societies with extremely low levels. Estimates of homicide rates for specic stateless societies range from less than 1/100,000 to more than 1000/100,000. According to most estimates, observed stateless societies have signicantly more violence on average than most contemporary state societies, but none could be described as constant civil war. Some observed stateless societies (such as the Batek, the Paliyan, and others) that have virtually no violence (Bonta 1997; Kelly 1995 Kelly , 2024 . These societies disprove the hypothesis that statelessness is inherently violent.
Although many bands have constant tension with neighbors, actual conicts are brief, and band members clearly lack any obsession with security. According to one description, band societies do not build fortications. None have been reported to stockpile food and supplies for military purposes. None engage in special training activities for warriors. None possess a special military technology but use ordinary tools and weapons of the hunt. (Fried 1967 (Fried , 1012 Americans with their guns, alarms, and private security services display greater fear of violence.
In 1970, the U.S. murder rate was 7.9/100,000. This does not including legally negligent or justiable homicide or deaths in war, but even adding those would make the U.S. rate low compared to the rates of all but the most peaceful stateless societies and far below the rate of 165.9/100,000 for the so-called`Fierce People', the Yanomamo, at about the same time. The homicide rate for black males in Cleveland at that time was 142.1/100,000 (Knauft 1987, 464) , slightly lower than the Yanomamo, but the Yanomamo could not be jailed or sent to Vietnam. So, it is possible that a black male would nd Cleveland society to be more dangerous than the society of the`Fierce People' not to mention the Batek or the Paliyan.
Short
Although Hobbes misidentied the reason, hunter-gatherers have a signicantly shorter life expectancy and are less healthy on average than people in contemporary state societies. These are the most obvious advantages of contemporary states. Many of the diseases and other risks faced by people in stateless societies have been eliminated or greatly reduced. Merely because the average person experiences better health and a longer life, one cannot assume that state societies do nothing to cause some groups within society to experience worse health or shorter lives.
Most of the dierence in life expectancy is accounted for by infant and childhood mortality. A hunter-gatherer who reached age 15 could expect to live into her 70s, to meet her grandchildren and possibly her great-grandchildren. She could also expect tragedy in her life, with the early death of some of her children, relatives, and friends, but she would not experience the constant fear of imminent death that Hobbes described.
Although contemporary state societies have eliminated many diseases and risks, they have also introduced new diseases and risks that have made signicant numbers of people worse o in terms of life and health. Looking over the statistics, one gets the impression that most of what people in band societies die of contemporary industrialized states have cured or prevented, and most of what people in contemporary state societies die of hardly aicts people in band society. Hunter-gatherers are largely immune to the chronic degenerative diseases which produce the greater part of all mortality in auent nations. Obesity, diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, cancer and stroke are extremely rare in hunter-gatherer populations (Eaton/Eaton 1999, 4512) . Thus, although the average life expectancy is longer, state society causes a signicant number of people to live shorter lives.
At the time Hobbes was writing, even the average person had no longer life expectancy and probably no higher overall welfare than people in band societies (Clark 2007, 1) . The trend toward rising life expectancy and living standards began only in the 1800s, reaching the poorer nations only in the last few decades.
It has yet to reach the poorest populations within the poorer countries. In the United States, as late as 1900, life expectancy for non-white males was 32.5 years (Harris 1977, 14) , 4.5 years shorter than the twentieth-century of life expectancy of the Ache band in South America (Gurven/Kaplan 2007, 327) . Think of that. The United States enjoyed 10,000 years of technological innovations since the invention of agriculture. Yet, any non-white boy from the United States would had a higher life expectancy, if before he was born, his mother could have somehow joined the Ache.
Freedom
Another striking feature of band society is the extent to which their members are free in the negative sense of interference by other people. Bands don't have enforced rules or hierarchical structures. Some anthropologists have observed that people in band societies can go through their whole lives without hearing an order. If any person or group doesn't like the way the band does things, they can camp a mile away and live as they wish.
Compare this situation to that of a disadvantaged person in modern society. They are not allowed to hunt, gather, sh, farm or do any work for themselves. They must take jobs and take orders all day. They are not allowed to camp where they want. So, they are forced to give a third of their income to a landlord, who will give them orders about how the living space can be used. They are allowed to forage only in other people's garbage. And even if homeless, they are subject to orders from police and other authorities.
Freedom counts toward welfare. Most people don't like taking orders. Even if people in capitalist states can achieve a higher consumption by following orders, the loss of freedom has to count as a loss of welfare against any such benet. Perhaps some reasonable people would be unwilling to give up this freedom for increased consumption.
4.6 Culture, Industry, Alienation, an Observed Choice Hobbes supposed people in the state of nature lack all industry, agriculture, oceanic navigation, imported goods, architecture, Earth-moving instruments, knowledge of geography, calendars and timepieces, arts, and letters. According to Hoekstra, this famous litany of what that condition lacks [. . . ] is an adaptation of a hyperbolic trope, characterizing uncivilized peoples by a negative list, which became conventional in the century after Columbus landed (Hoekstra 2007, 113) . If Hoekstra is right, Hobbes would have expected his seventeenthcentury European readers to recognize this as a list of things that Native Americans lacked and to take it as strong evidence that indigenous peoples' lives were clearly worse than the lowliest Briton's.
Interestingly, although not all stateless societies lack all of these things, Hobbes was right that most band societies lack all the things on this list except for arts. Today few people are ethnocentric enough to assume that indigenous people are necessarily worse o because they do not have all these things. Having architecture does not equal living a better life. But contemporary theorists might argue that state societies are capable of providing much more varied cultural opportunities. However, more varied cultural opportunity does not necessarily imply a more satisfying cultural life, especially for the most economically disadvantaged. Along with some satised people, contemporary state society produces a substantial group of discontents. Marx identied this problem more than a century and a half ago as one of alienation. Many people spend their lives serving the goals of others to get money merely to consume, but they lack time and autonomy to build a satisfying life.
Ethnographers report no discontented minority in band societies. All observed indigenous societies have a rich, satisfying cultural life with song, dance, storytelling, and plenty of social interaction. The happy demeanor of band members is widely recognized among ethnographers. The commonplace misery of discontented people in state society has not been observed in band societies.
One way to determine whether everyone in state societies is better o than everyone in stateless societies is to observe what people do when they have the opportunity to choose between the two. When people from stateless societies come in contact with people from state societies, they almost invariably want some of the things people have in state society (e.g. tools, tobacco, manufactured goods). But people in state societies almost invariably want things from stateless societies (e.g. furs, tobacco, land). Neither request can be interpreted as willingness to submit to the other's authority.
One might be tempted to ask why people from modern states don't join small-scale societies? The simple answer is that states no longer allow them to choose. Stateless societiesmade up at least partly by people who ed state societieshave existed on the peripheries of states for thousands of years. Few if any of these areas disappeared because their residents simply decided to live under state authority. Most of them were forcibly incorporated. In southeast Asia some of these areas still successfully resist full incorporation into nation states (Scott 2009 ). Abandoning the state involves moving hundreds of miles from family and friends and other personal sacrices. That signicant numbers of people have been willing to choose statelessness whenever that choice has been available strongly implies that at least some very disadvantaged people have rational reasons to prefer life outside state authority. If the Hobbesian hypothesis were correct, even if the origin of the state was force, people would seek to join once its benets are clear. Instead, archeologists nd that permanent states tend to appear only in places where it is dicult for people to get away from them (Carneiro 1970) .
Today there are very few pockets of stateless societies still allowed to exist: none in Europe, North America or Australia, very few on the other three continents and some islands. Virtually all indigenous peopleswhether stateless or notare under constant encroachment from contemporary states or corporations. It would be disingenuous to claim that suddenly no one wants to leave the state just at the point in history when states have made it nearly impossible for anyone to leave. Consider a thought experiment. If there were still a periphery somewhere, would anyone from contemporary ghettos ee to it? Unfortunately, we expect that overcrowding would be a bigger problem than lack of interest. Consider a reverse-thought experiment. Go to an indigenous person living outside state authority in the rainforest of Brazil. She's seen the premature death of friends and loved ones, but she lives among her family and friends; she is under no one's command; and she has a rich culture stretching back for centuries. Explain that she has the opportunity to become one of the least advantaged people in contemporary state society. She could live in a shanty outside Brasilia. She could be a homeless person on Skid Row in Los Angeles. She could work the late shift at McDonald's in Newark. For the rst time in her life, she would live close to people who have much more and who stigmatize her for having less. If you believe contractarianism successfully justies existing states, you must believe that she would be irrational to decline any of these options.
An Overall Assessment
This assessment has shown that life in band societies is not idyllic or auent; it is dicult; and it is much less prosperous on average than life in modern capitalist states. But it is not miserable; and we have no good reason to believe that everyone in state society is necessarily better o. Contemporary states have not simply failed to help everyone; they have created conditions that make some people worse o than they could expect to be in band societythe homeless, the destitute, the disaected, and the victims of modern diseases.
We put the question to Kim Hill, an ethnographer known for debunking the belief that hunter-gatherer societies are`auent,' and one of the most pessimistic anthropologists on the question of how dicult the hunter-gatherer lifestyle is. Yet, he replied:
No, I don't think you can say that everyone today is better o than everyone was in the hunter-gatherer period. [. . . ] People in modern societies have better health on average and longer lifespans, but there is more to life than longevity. Hunter-gatherers often have more satisfying social environments in my opinion (I have lived more than 30 years with dierent groups of hunter-gatherers). Modern societies are plagued by emotional, physical and mental problems that probably weren't very common in the past. [. . . ] for example the shift from hunter-gatherer diets to modern diets has caused plenty of misery and unhappiness in the form of obesity, diabetes, heart disease, etc. We know less about the psychological and emotional mismatch between our evolved cognition and the modern environment. But hunter-gatherers seem to have less depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, suicide, feeling of alienation, etc. There are no campus massacres in the hunter-gatherer ethnographic literature for example. All these observations and many more suggest that the advances of modern societies have also come with costs. (Kim Hill, personal correspondence)
The Hobbesian hypothesis was never more than a colonial prejudice, condescending both to indigenous people and to disadvantaged people in state society. This article might not have proven it false, but it has raised signicant doubt. If states are to be justied on contractarian grounds, they have to pay more attention to the physical, mental, and material wellbeing of disadvantaged citizens.
Implications
We have shown that the contractarian justication of sovereign government relies on the dubious empirical claim that everyone is better o in state society than they could reasonably expect to be in any stateless society. Therefore, the argument, as usually stated cannot justify the state. How should contractarians respond? As we've said, we don't expect anyone to demand the dissolution of all states in favor of the worldwide restoration of band society. A reader might react by replacing the contractarian justication by some justication of sovereignty that doesn't require the Hobbesian hypothesis or by a scheme to make largescale anarchy work. Without commenting on either response's plausibility, both are compatible with these article's ndings.
It is more interesting to consider four responses available within the contractarian framework. Contractarians could (1) challenge our ndings empirically, (2) accept our ndings and endorse policies to fulll the proviso, (3) accept our empirical ndings and the relevance of the proviso but argue for a weaker respon-sibility to fulll it, (4) concede our empirical ndings but argue for a dierent proviso.
Challenge Our Empirical Findings
Contractarians could challenge our empirical ndings. This would amount to the argument that the least well-o group in modern states actually are better o than they could reasonably expect to be in any stateless society. We welcome this response. It would amount to an agreement with the most important points in this article: the Hobbesian hypothesis is an essential premise in most contractarian justications of sovereignty, and its truth-value must be established by empirical investigation. There should be an enormous empirical debate over such an important hypothesis.
Anyone choosing this response should avoid appealing to common prejudice like Narveson (above) but to conduct a study at least as thorough as ours. This article is a preliminary report from a larger research project. It is meant to raise doubt about the Hobbesian hypothesis. We are happy to share our notes with critics.
This is the only response capable of fully preserving the contractarian justication of the state. Only this response preserves the claim that the state is inherently better for everyone than statelessness, so that anyone in a stateless environment should always choose to establish a state.
Accept Our Findings and Endorse Policies to Fulll the Proviso
We believe the most promising response is to accept that the Hobbesian hypothesis is not currently true and to set about making it true by policies to improve the wellbeing of disadvantaged individuals, so that virtually all of them are in fact better o than they could reasonably expect to be in a stateless society. The prospects are encouraging. Stateless societies provide a very low baseline, and few if any states are putting as much eort as they reasonably could into improving the living standards of disadvantaged people.
Once contractarians endorse that goal, empirical questions follow. How many people are below the baseline? What are the best policies to bring them up? Are they economically feasible? The solution could be as simple as a Rawlsian or Kavkaian guaranteed minimum, as long as policymakers research whether their policies fulll their objective. Any such minimum would have to include medical policies to prevent or counteract the new diseases that have come as side eects of contemporary state society.
Accept Our Empirical Findings and the Relevance of the Proviso but Argue for a Weaker Responsibility to Fulll It
Contractarians could accept our ndings, and accept that the relevant proviso compares state societies to all stateless societies including band societies, but argue the state does not have to bring as many people to the baseline as we suggest to justify its authority. This line of reasoning seems promising, but what reasons consistent with contractarian theory can one give for it? The most promising possibility relies on the ought-implies-can principle. Perhaps it is impossible for the state to give its enormous benets to most people without harming a few people, or the cost of ensuring that the state does no harm is unacceptably high. Although this argument is normatively plausible, it has three diculties for contractarianism. First, if the reason for not fullling the proviso is the impossibility of doing so, one is committed to fullling it if and when it is possible. Therefore, to rely on this argument, the state would have to employ all the strategies discussed in section 5.2 to help all the people it can. This kind of argument, then, relies on two additional empirical claims that require proof: it isn't possible to get everyone to the threshold required to fulll the proviso and whatever state one wants to justify does in fact get as many people as possible to that threshold. Given the great wealth disparities that exist in modern states it's doubtful that many of them could pass this test without doing much more to help the disadvantaged.
Second, strictly speaking, contractarianism implies that if there are people who do not benet from its rule, the state should either cease to exist or nd some way to leave them outside its authority. Perhaps no one ever intended contractarianism to be taken that literally, but dropping this claim essentially moves out of the realm of mutual advantage theory. The receipt of benet has been the whole thrust of the contractarian justication of the state extending back as far as the proto-contractarianism that Plato (2013) attributed to Socrates. Some critics of contractarianism argue that actual states have incentive to create contracts beneting some while leaving others out (Pateman 1988; Pateman/Mills 2007) , but contractarians insist the state has authority over you because it benets you. Most contractarians deal with the problem that not everyone actually agrees, but they usually attribute withheld consent to the irrational or unreasonable obstinacy of people who deny the benets they do in fact receive. Once one admits that social arrangements mutually advantage only a subset of the population, a mutual advantage theory has little to say to those outside that subset.
If so, contractarianism might be able to justify the state to a large majority of people by pointing to mutual advantage, but some other class of theory would be needed to justify state authority those who are harmed.
Third, the assumption that everyone benets is incredibly strong, and relaxing it raises many normative and empirical questions that contractarians have ignored. What portion of the population does the state have to benet to be justied? What is an acceptable cost? To whom must it be acceptablethose inside the contract (who benet) or those outside (who are harmed)? What responsibilities does the state have to those who are harmed by social arrangements? Are they somehow bound by a contract they have no rational reason to sign? Are they free to disobey laws with impunity? Should states restore the periphery so that citizens have the option of eeing to stateless societies? Must the state minimize the harm to those it cannot help? What policies minimize the harm? Would society be able to bring more people to the threshold at a lower population; if so, does it have the responsibility to promote birth control to reach the point at which they maximize the number of people who reach the threshold? This article does not attempt to answer these questions for contractarians. It merely points out that the assertion of the Hobbesian hypothesis has allowed contractarians to dodge these questions by assuming them away.
Contractarians might employ a probabilistic argument to justify why not everyone ends up better o in the state than in stateless society. They could argue that the average person born into the state is better o than the average person born into a stateless society, so that ex ante everyone is better o even though ex post some are worse o. This argument is also promising, but it has several diculties for contractarians. First, it risks collapsing into utilitarianism, which most contractarians would like to avoid. Second, it is not easy to separate ex ante from ex post; and any eort to do so raises dicult questions.
Third, contractarianism considers risks of the state of nature to be natural, but new risks coming into existence with the state are imposed by its authority. If some imposed risks are not necessary to eliminating the natural risks, one might reasonably object to them. Fourth, this argument also raises dicult questions that contractarians usually ignore. Do the imposed risks aect everyone equally or are there identiable groups that are less likely to benet and/or more likely to be harmed by them? Can these dierences be eliminated? Are people in the at-risk group less obliged to obey state authority than others?
These eorts might be used to give good reason why the state does not have to help everyone, but they do not imply that states have fullled their responsibility, and they bring up normative questions for the justication of the state.
Concede Our Empirical Findings but Argue for a Dierent Proviso
Contractarians could concede that our comparison of disadvantaged people in contemporary state societies shows that some disadvantaged people in state societies are worse o than people in stateless societies, but argue that this comparison is normatively irrelevant. One might be tempted to point to the vast majority of normative literature on distributive justice, which takes place in isolation from any such comparison, but the vast majority of this literature also takes place in isolation from the contractarian justication of sovereignty. Most of it simply assumes the state is justied. Authors might assume some other justication of the state, but since contractarianism is overwhelmingly the most popular one, it is safe to say that many authors who write about distributive justice assume what contractarians have consistently told them for 350 years. Supposedly the minimal conditions to justify state authority are met, because the Hobbesian hypothesis is true; distributive justice, therefore, need not trouble itself with this comparison. This is another reason to investigate the hypothesis.
One promising way to argue for the irrelevance of the comparison is to argue for a dierent proviso, possibly along the following lines. Although bands t the denition of statelessness, the band lifestyle does not work at a larger scale. It is impossible for all 7 billion people to live in band societies at the same time. If all of the governments of the world disappeared, the likely outcome would be massive civil war. Therefore, one might conclude, civil war is the only relevant proviso for contemporary states. Assuming civil war is as terrible as Hobbes describes, the civil-war proviso is much lower than the stateless-society proviso used throughout this article. Against the civil-war proviso, perhaps states are justied. We concede the empirical claims in this argument but doubt that one can construct a plausible argument from them to the conclusion that the stateless-society proviso is normatively irrelevant.
Although the argument in this section and the ought-implies-can argument addressed in section 5.3 both have to do with population size, they are very dierent arguments. The ought-implies-can argument: P1: The state had to develop, because of the size of the population.
P2: Under present conditions the state cannot avoid harming people relative to the stateless-society proviso.
C: While these conditions persist, the state does not have to satisfy that proviso.
As section 5.3 argued, under this argument the proviso remains relevant, although it can be overridden. The civil-war proviso argument:
P1: The state had to develop, because of the size of the population.
P2:
The current alternative to the state is civil war.
C: The state has no moral responsibility to fulll the stateless-society proviso even if it can.
To focus on the area in which the out-implies-can and the irrelevance argument produce dierent results, this section assumes a situation in which some people are below the threshold for the stateless-society proviso, above the threshold for the civil-war proviso, and it is possible for the state to use policies that would bring everyone up to the stateless-society proviso at a reasonable cost. Although (short of murder, which would violate the proviso) the current population size is xed, it cannot be seen as a completely exogenous variable. The existence of the state, and the aggression of states in conquering most stateless societies around the world are part of the reasons that population is so high. The current population size has been aected by past policies, and future population size will be aected by today's policies. Over time, the state does control population. Therefore, the appeal to current population size runs into a problem Jean Hampton recognized, choice is essentially`rigged' by a political society that creates in us the very reason we use to choose it and that appears to justify its existence (Hampton 1988, 271) . People in power simultaneously use the threat of civil war as an excuse not to help disadvantaged people and pursue policies to maintain that thread of civil war so that they will not have to help disadvantaged people in the future. There might be other good reasons to maintain a high population, but if so, it is reasonable for people whose current living standards are below the stateless-society threshold to ask for compensation so that they too can share in the benets of higher population.
If people in power refuse to compensate, it is hard to maintain that they have done what contractarianism requires: to justify authority to any reasonable or rational person subject to it. Stateless societies are real, not some theoretical alternative. The disadvantaged make a moderate request when they ask for compensation to the point that they are no worse o than people were before states conquered their region. A contractarian committed to the irrelevance of that comparison has to go to people so disadvantaged; claim that more advantaged people have no moral responsibility to help any such people, no matter how many of them there are nor how aordable it might be to help them. Disadvantage people should be morally concerned only with whether they would be better o in a massive civil war. A contractarian committed to the civil-war proviso would have to assert that any disadvantaged person who demanded more than that is either unreasonable or irrational. Such a dismissal of a very modest request strains credulity, and so we conclude that the stateless society proviso remains relevant: any state that can but refuses to satisfy it fails to meet the minimal conditions for justifying its authority.
Conclusion
This article argued the following points. The Hobbesian hypothesis, which we dene as the claim that all people are better o under state authority than they would be outside of it, is an empirical claim about all stateless societies. It is an essential premise in most contractarian justications of government sovereignty. Many small-scale societies are stateless. Anthropological evidence from them provides sucient reason to doubt the truth of the hypothesis, if not to reject it entirely. Therefore, contractarian theory has not done what it claims to do: it has not justied state sovereignty to each person subject to it by demonstrating that they benet from that authority. To be justied in contractarian terms, states have to do something to improve the living standards of disadvantaged people under their rule.
If instead we assume, based on prejudices inherited from our colonial ancestors, that everyone in state society is automatically better o than everyone in stateless societies, we ignore important normative issues connected to our responsibility to the disadvantaged in our own societies. 
